# ASSESSMENT OF THE APRIL $20^{\text {th }} 1997$ TORNADO/GUSTNADO IN SOUTHEAST BOISE 

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## INTRODUCTION

A small tornado, confirmed by NWS survey members, occurred in Southeast Boise on April $20^{\text {th }}, 1997$. This storm was associated with a fast moving surface cold front and low topped convective elements along the frontal surface. The developing squall line took on an accelerating Bow Echo appearance as the line progressed through Ada County to the Eastern end of the city of Boise. While no severe signatures were detected on radar, low level horizontal vorticity due to low level wind shear could allow the rapid spin-up and vorticity stretching causing a tornado or gustnado to occur. This would most likely form on the leading edge of the line near the gust front and area of maximum low level convergence. These conditions are favorable for the development of land spout Tornadoes, which develop under strong updrafts but are not necessarily associated with supercell thunderstorms. Another possibility is a Gustnado or Tornado without any connection to an updraft. These types of Tornadoes are not well understood.

## SYNOPTIC SETTING

A strong fast moving cold front was moving into the Treasure Valley between 9am and 11 am MDT on April 20 th , 1997. (attachment \#1). The atmosphere in advance of the front was somewhat moist and conditionally unstable. Modified soundings using the SHARP workstation produced cape values of $300 \mathrm{~J} / \mathrm{KG}$ for Boise and about $800 \mathrm{~J} / \mathrm{KG}$ for the Twin Falls area with the assumption that temperatures would warm into the lower 60 s . SR-helicity values of $207 \mathrm{~m} 2 / \mathrm{s} 2$ were produced from the 12 z Boise sounding. A powerful North Pacific jetstream was moving into the region from Central Oregon and was oriented nearly perpendicular to the cold frontal position. At least one 130kt isotach was associated with the jet axis and the Treasure Valley was located in the left front exit region of this strong wind core.

More impressive, as seen later on SRM four panel displays, was the strong rear inflow into the developing line along the front. These conditions allowed a segment of the front to bow ahead of the rest of the front, accelerating and assuming squall line characteristics. This pattern, although fairly uncommon in the Intermountain West, is a familiar regime in many other parts of the country. ( Figure \#1). Velocity data showed a large area of $35-50$ knot winds inbound to the radar, with isolated winds in excess of 50 knots being depicted. (Figure \#2).

## OBSERVATIONS AND STORM SPOTTER REPORTS

As the line passed the observing sensors at Ontario, Caldwell and Boise, peak recorded wind gusts were around 36 knots or 42 mph . Spotter report estimates were mostly in the 35-45 mph range with estimates of 50 mph becoming more common as the line advanced through Ada County. Most RAWS station reports at lower elevations were consistent with these readings. Also, a spotter 6 miles north of Emmett measured 52 mph winds at an elevation of 800 feet above the valley floor. Lightning detection equipment did not record any lightning strikes in Idaho (LA1 charts) during the event, although eyewitness accounts reported hearing thunder. (Most likely no CG strikes but CC strikes possible).

## OFFICE ACTIONS AND DECISIONS MADE

Based on no severe signatures seen on the WSR 88-D, combined with spotter reports and automated observations of $35-45 \mathrm{mph}$, the Forecasters decided to cover this event with strongly worded NOWCASTS. These short term forecasts included detail as to the timing and location of the line producing the strong winds. Meteorological thinking, interpretation of data, and Forecaster judgment allowed the Forecasters to decide between a Severe Thunderstorm Warning or a strongly worded NOWCAST. The nowcast was decided as the best product to issue. It was not an easy decision to make and could have gone either way. High Wind Warnings and Wind Advisories were not considered appropriate in this case because of the limited duration and location of stronger winds over a narrow corridor.

The first NOWCAST was issued at 925 am MDT for the Western end of the Treasure Valley. By this time the Forecasters had received an observation of 30 knots at Ontario and 27 knots at Caldwell. Zone Forecasts were updated to include stronger winds and the mention of a thunderstorm. The Boise Airport tower was also notified of the approaching line of weather. At 957 am MDT an updated NOWCAST was issued for winds of 35-45 mph and the inclusion of small hail and brief heavy rain. The line continued east across the city with a narrow swath of winds in the $35-50 \mathrm{mph}$ range. As of the second nowcast issuance, there were still no reports of damage or of the small Tornado or Gustnado.

At about 10 am a call from Ada County Dispatch indicated some wind damage had occurred in the Five Mile and Overland area and also in Southeast Boise on Constitution Way. Along with this report were two unconfirmed sightings of funnel clouds/tornado in the above mentioned areas. At this time the squall line itself was moving out of the Boise area and into the Mountain Home Desert. At 1025 am a third nowcast was issued for winds $40-50 \mathrm{mph}$ as the line approached the city of Mountain Home. When alerted to the possibility of the Tornado, the staff notified the WCM who conducted a damage survey in the aforementioned locations later in the day. A small tornado was confirmed by the WCM upon completing the damage survey. It should be noted that no other reports of damage were received except for the Tornado/Gustnado in Southeast Boise and some yard and roof damage in the Five Mile and Overland areas.

## COMMENTS

Radar exhibited no evidence of low level rotation and no rotating thunderstorms. Spotter reports showed nothing of significance at least initially. On other occasions small Tornadoes/Gustnadoes have occurred in the Boise CWA which were also not detected by radar. This is consistent with current thinking that these types of tornadoes are extremely difficult to detect with radar, due to their small size being below the resolution capability of the radar and the likelihood that the radar beam was overshooting the area in concern at close range. The WSR-88D did exhibit velocity signatures that were close to Severe Thunderstorm criteria, but it is common to see higher wind speeds on the radar than those that manifest themselves on the ground. All other spotter reports and observed wind gusts were below Severe Thunderstorm criteria, except for the Tornado report.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. The fact that no warning was issued and a Tornado occurred is a source of concern. However, the decision not to warn is often more difficult than the Decision to warn. Had the Tornado not occurred, then it is likely that no Severe weather would have been observed. Having a Severe Thunderstorm Warning out would have been preferable to not having any warning out, but It would not have necessarily been the right decision in this case.
2. The NOWCAST program can be a powerful forecast tool with accurately timed short term forecasts, such as was shown in this event. This was clearly a case that could have gone either way. (WARN vs. DON'T WARN). The nature of our warning tier of products, with NOWCASTS being used for everything that isn't severe, hampers our dissemination of significant events which may cause near severe conditions or greater.



FIGURE 2














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